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It is by now a commonplace to assert that most Latin American countries 
have experienced rather respectable per capita income growth rates over the 
past quarter century but that the performance in the employment and income 
distribution dimensionshas remained "unsatisfactory" and is probably worsening. 
Certainly Latin American economies have thus far provided substantial 
support for the so-called "Kuznets law" that income distribution must 
get worse before it gets better in the course of rapid growth, on a 
country-specific historical rather than simply multi-country cross 
sectional basis. Why is this so and can anything be done about it-­
in the light of our present understanding of development processes and 
of the specific Latin American reality? 
The first issue which needs to be addressed, or at least disposed 
of, is that equity and employment outcomes are perhaps not really 
"unsatisfactory" from the point of view of the elites in control of 
most of the countries in the region--and that it is in their interest, 
and in the interest of their allies outside who support them, to pay 
lip service to the pursuit of "new" development objectives the better 
to enable everyone to pursue "business (i.e. growth) as usual." There 
is little point in speculating. about "constraints. " and"bo stac1es inII• 
the way of ameliorating performance on employment and distributional 
gronnds if we are indeed dealing only with rhetorical devices on the 
part of international agencies, Latin American presidents and opinion 
makers in the advanced countries. 
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While few would assert with confidence that we can count on a 
straightforward, underlying desire to change the status of the Latin 
American unemployed or poor, either absolutely or relatively, in all 
of the "governing circles" of either the DC's and LDC's involved, we 
will assume that there exists a reasonable interest in redressing 
extreme imbalances--if it can be done at a "reasonable' cost in terms 
of more traditional national (and individual) objectives. The question 
of constraints to improved employment and equity thus comes down to 
the extent of trade-offs among objectives and of how they can be softened. 
While the assessment of what level of trade-offs is acceptable and 
what level is not is, of course, closely related to the above issue 
of "who governs" and "who speaks," we will in this paper abstract 
from the cynical notion, held by many on the left, that we are engaged 
here only in national and international charades enacted to gain time. 
What does that leave us with? I would argue that it leaves us with 
a clear obligation to examine the nature of these trade-offs on the Latin 
American scene and to present policy-makers on both sides with as much 
theoretical structure and as much historical and •cross sectional evidence 
on these issues as we possibly can muster. Now it may still be true, as 
Dr. Prebish pointed out some years ag~ that more rapid growth along the 
same tracks on which Latin America-has been travelling in the past can 
yield a solution to the employment, if not necessarily the equity 
problem. But I hope that even he would admit today that the fuel 
(no pun intended) for doubling growth rates and thus "pulling" the 
unemployed and tmderemployed into productive activity without changea 
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in structure is not likely to be forthcoming except perhaps in such 
special cases as Venezuela. 
1The World Bank, especially Selowsky,. on the other hand, sometimes 
sound as if the problem of equity, if not of unemployment, can be 
solved via fiscal redistribution after the fact. But even he seems 
recently to have become more sanguine about the limits to Latin American 
fiscal and administrative capacity which would surely be tested by 
any effort to "redistribute from growth." If neither the Latin American 
"growth locomotive" or its taxes and transfer payments are likely to 
solve the problem over time it becomes necessary to examine what can 
be achieved by possible changes in the way in which growth itself is 
now being generated. This paper, in fact, starts with the basic 
assumption that growth, employment and distributional outcomes theoreti­
cally can be and, for policy reasons must be, tackled simultaneously. 
At worst, we may discover that explicit hard choices have to be made 
between,say, reductions in the Gini and per capita income growth. At 
best, we may find ourselves in the more pleasurable circumstances of 
devising strategies which permit Latin America's locomotives to move 
out on new tracks. It is only in this way that the existence of trade­
offs among desirable objectives, and of the possible alleviation of 
such trade-offs, can be analyzed. 
In attempting to tackle this problem in.the Latin American 
context we are, of course, painfully aware that there is no such thing 
as "the" Latin American economy, not even "the" Latin American semi-
industrial country. Nevertheless, by concentrating on the latter 
subset which includes, inter alia, Mexico, Brazil, and Colombia, 
we perhaps commit a lesser crime from a typological point of view. 
~- Selowsky, "Balancing Trickle Down and Basic Needs Strategies: 
Income Distribution Issues in Large Middle-Income Cotmtries with Special 
Reference to Latin America", World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 353, 1979 • 
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What these economies seem to have in common is, relative to other 
relevant NIC's, i.e. of the East Asian variety, a strong natural 
resources base, inferior but a still fairly good human resources 
endowment, and a lesser pressure of population on the land, but with 
still. substantial pockets of labor surplus. These systems have gen­
erally exhibited annual growth rates of 6% and above, manufacturing 
growth rates of 15% to 20% or more, but with unemployment and under­
employment, if admittedly difficult to measure, substantial and 
probably rising, and with Gini coefficients (or some other measure 
of income distribution equity) typically hovering at the upper 
extreme of international experience, and worsening over the past 
two decades. 
The task we have set ourselves in this paper is to examine the 
"causes" of what appears to be this unhappy historical conflict between 
growth, on the one hand, and unemployment and the distribution of 
income, on the other, in "the" Latin American case. In the course of 
this effort we hope to be able to distinguish elements of the causal 
explanation which are related to given"initial conditions" and those 
which are subject to flexibility, either in terms of economic or 
political options. We will, moreover, find it helpful not only to uti-
lize the Latin .American historical laboratory but also that of the East 
Asian NIC's which have apparently managed to eliminate their tmemployment 
problem and improve their distribution of income in the course of rapid 
growth during the same quarter century. Our full awareness of important 
differences among Latin American countries is complemented by less well­
known differences among the East Asian NIC' s (the "Gang of Four"). Our 
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discussion will thus deal mainly with Colombia and Mexico as prototypes 
of the Latin American NIC's and with Taiwan as the prototype of the 
East Asian NIC's. We do this in the full realization of the existence 
of important differences among members of each type--and in the even 
fuller realization that inter-country comparisons, even when qualified 
carefully in terms of intra vs inter-type argmnents, are often not 
particularly well received. The reason we persevere is three-fold; 
one, the East Asian NIC's happen to be the only group of LDC's which 
seem to have succeeded in avoiding the crucial Kuznets curve trade-off 
among development objectives; two,we believe that comparative analy­
tical history which is typology-sensitive should raise fewer hackles than 
SO-country cross-sectional studies which usually are not; three, because 
in the end, given our imperfect science, all one can do in pursuit of 
the elusive truth is to offer causal suggestions rather than tight 
proofs as to which elements of the analytical web might or might not 
be more generally relevant, and leave it to the reader to come to his 
own conclusions. 
In Section II we propose to sketch in the contrasting initial 
conditions in the Latin American and East Asian proto-typical NIC cases, 
at the ttarting gate 9 so to speak and to briefly describe the divergent 
path growth has taken since in the two cases. Section III will examine 
the causal relationship between the nature of the growth path and the 
employment and income distribution performance. Section IV will present 
a brief summary of our conclusions with respect to the existing constraints 
on improved employment and equity performance in the Latin American NIC's. 
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II. Initial Conditions and Growth Phases 
As we pointed out above, ignoring important typological differences 
at the starting gate would make it extremely difficult to analyze contrast­
ing subsequent growth and employment/equity outcomes in any meaningful 
fashion. The "typical" Latin American NIC, some amalgam of Colombia, 
Mexico and Brazil, started its transition growth effort from a very 
different initial base than that encountered by the typical East 
Asian NIC, some amalgam of Taiwan and Korea. The Latin American LDC' s, 
first of all, began their effort at transition growth substantially 
earlier, i.e. in the mid-30s and largely as an unintended by-product of 
policies designed mainly to provide balance of payments insulation 
from the international- impact of the Great Depression. This has had 
the consequence of a much longer growth experience of a particular 
type and a longer time for sectoral interest clashes to harden into 
encrusted bargains which tend to reduce a system's economic and 
p9litical flexibility and its ability to exploit underlying comple­
mentarities among developmental objectives. 
A second important distinguishing characteristic is the different 
nature of the colonial heritage as seen in, say, Colombia and, say, Taiwan. 
In one case, we have a Spanish colonial• experience focussing heavily on 
extractive primary export activities within a preassigned scheme of the 
international division of labor; in the other, Japanese colonialism 
focussed instead on the agricultural food producing sector at an early 
stage mainly because the colonial goods happened to be rice and sugar, 
instead of precious metals and tobacco. The workings of a "vent for 
surplus" type of export orientation means a good deal less attention is 
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paid early to both the physical and organizational infrastructure in 
the rural areas. 
Thirdly, the typical Latin American case, Mexico and Colombia 
included, is generally better endowed with both arable land and related 
natural resources and much less subject to the heavy labor surplus con­
ditions initially encountered in Asia. On the other hand, while Latin 
America's entrepreneurial and other hmnan resources compare favorably 
with those of most LDC's, it is fair to say that East Asia's overall 
educational heritage is generally viewed as superior to 
that of the typical Latin American case. Moreover, the average size 
of the typical Latin American NIC is somewhat larger, thus, ceteris 
paribus, the potential role of international trade somewhat smaller. 
All LDC's, the world's NIC's in the forefront, can be said to 
have been engaged in more or less serious efforts at achieving transi­
tion from agrarianism to modem growth in the Kuznets tradition 
over the past quarter century. While they thus start this effort 
with substantially different historical constraints and possibilitie~ 
it is by now a fairly well accepted notion that their transition path 
is likely to move through a series of more or less continuous and 
gradually changing subphases. These represent a combination of natural 
progressions and changing policy packages which accommodate changes 
in the underlying economic conditions--or fail to quickly enough,as 
the case may be. A quick review of the sub-phasing encountered in 
the two sets of NIC's will lay important additional groundwork for 
our analysis of the underlying nature of the constraints on better 
employment and income distribution performance in the Latin American 
case. 
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The initial sub-phase of transition is the well-known primary 
import substitution pattern, with traditional land-based exports 
financing producer goods imports assigned to the gradually increased 
domestic production of previously imported consumer non-durables. 
In the Latin American NIC's this sub_-phase, begun in the 1930's, 
generally ran out of steam around the early 1950s as domestic markets 
for these non-durable consumer goods gradually became exhausted 
and the rate of growth of industrial output began to decline. _The 
East Asian NIC experience, starting later, presents a more or less 
faithful mirror image (see line 1, table 1) with two important observed 
differences, i.e. a milder version of infant industry protectionism 
and, given the colonial heritage, a rural sector much less neglected 
in relative terms than was true in the Latin American case. 
When primary import substitution ends, however, a new expansion 
path clearly has to be found--and here a major divergence between the 
two types of NIC's may be observed. In the typical LDC dualistic 
economy setting there are basically two options readily available: 
one is to maintain the essential ingredients of the import substitution 
policy syndrome which by now is too well known to require further 
elaboration--but shift attention from non-durable consumer goods to 
the production,primarily for the domestic market initially and for 
international markets later~of capital goods, consumer durables and 
the processing of intermediate goods. This sub-phase may be labelled 
secondary import substitution/export promotion, i.e. the system continues 
to rely mainly on traditional land-based exports to fuel the production 
for domestic markets (and increasingly to subsidize industrial exports) 
of more capital and technology intensive goods. The other option is to 
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give a new lease of life to the non-durable consumer goods industries 
which, having benefitted from initial protection in domestic markets, 
may now be ready to be turned loose on international markets--with the 
help of some key changes in the policy setting. Its success requires 
not only lower levels of effective protection for industry and a greater 
market orientation generally but also a continuation of the prior policy 
of rural sector-oriented investments, and the maintenance of a fairly 
equal distribution of assets, via land reform. This choice may be called 
export substitution, i.e. the gradual substitution of traditional land­
based by non-traditional unskilled labor based industrial exports. 
Clearly the changing resources flow structure as well as the policy 
packages which accommodate it are generally too complicated to fit 
neatly into these idealized categories, i.e. every developing country 
represents a complicated mixture of many tendencies; moreover demarcations 
between historical subphases are always blurred by a good deal of pulling 
and hauling and contradictory policies at any one point in time. Never­
theless, it is approximately true that an important shift must take place 
at the end of primary import substitution. 
With these caveats in mind, we may assert that the Latin American 
NIC's had a tendency to shift directly to a secondary import substitution 
regime in the 1950s, while the East Asian NIC's had a tendency to shift 
first towards a labor intensive industrial export substitution phase, 
before moving, in the 70's, towards secondary import substitution and 
export substitution (notice not export promotion, about which distinction 
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more later). We believe that the apparently larger trade-off or conflict 
between growth (see rows 4 and 6) and employment cum equity (see rows 11 
and 12) in the Latin American, than the East Asian, case has much to do 
with this differential societal choice, i.e. the skipping of the unskilled 
labor fuelled primary export substitution phase. In what follows we hope 
to establish some prima facie causal relationships in support of this 
notion. Moreover, the focus of our attention will be on the economic and 
political reasons for the choices made in the Latin American case in the 
past and, perhaps more relevant, on the choices currently available. 
III. Divergent Growth Paths, Employment and Equity. 
Any fuller discussion of the effects of past policy choices and/or 
of the policy options facing Latin American NIC's today must, of course, 
be based on a causal analysis linking the growth path chosen with a 
system's employment cum equity performance. In an economy in which the 
agricultural sector continues to have a heavy weight and in which open 
urban unemployment is dwarfed by substantial rural underemployment, it 
is essential to try to differentiate between rural and urban households, 
both with respect to the spatial dimension of economic activity and dis­
tributional outcomes. Urban families are basically eµgaged in industrial 
and service activities generating mainly wage and property incomes. Rural 
families, on the other hand, are engaged in both agricultural activities 
generating a merged agricultural income and non-agricultural activites 
generating wage and property income. 
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We will find it useful, moreover, to utilize a specific analytical 
device to link output, employment and income distribution behaviorally, i.e. 
by _ decomposing the overall family distribution of income in any of our 
representative cases into the distribution of each of the major components 
of family income (i.e., agricultural, non-agricultural wages, non­
agricultural property, etc.), weighted by the importance of each of these 
in the total income (i.e., the ftmctional relative shares). 1 In other 
words, if we use the Gini coefficient G as a SUDmlary measure of the size 
y 
distribution, it can be defined approximately as: 
where Gw, GTI, and GA represent the Ginis of wage, property and agricultural 
income, respectively, and ¢w' ¢TI and ¢A the relative shares of wage, property 
and agricultural income. Thus, a given factor component usually contri-
butes more heavily to overall inequality, the higher its inequality and 
the higher its share. 
Applying this notion to non-agricultural income only, any change in 
total income equality through time may be written as: 
dG 




1This is an over-simplification explained more fully in "Growth and 
the Family Distribution of Income by Factor Components," G. Ranis, J. Fei, 
S. Kuo, Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 1978. For a full treatment 
of Gini decomposition analysis see Growth With Equity: The Taiwan Case, 
G. Ranis, J. Fei, S. Kuo, Oxford University Press, December 1979. 
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i.e. it is determined by two types of forces, which we may label the flll1ctional 
distribution effect and the factor Gini effect. The former focuses on a 
change in the functional shares, the latter on a change in the distribu-
tion of any component factor. income. If the wage share gains over time 
at the expense of the property share, such a change will obviously favor 
overall equality if and only if wage income is more equally distributed 
than property income. This is the way the functional shares can be linked 
to the size distribution of income. Since, in fact, G w is usually <G,7f an 
increase in labor's functional share will always help the overall size distri-
bution of income. Secondly, since a decline in the Gini of any factor 
will contribute to a decline in the overall Gini--in proportion to the 
weight of that factor--the direction of the factor Gini effect is also 
clear. The trend of the factor Ginis themselves requires knowledge 
concerning changes in the ownership pattern of human and capital resources, 
via formal or informal education, and saving behavior plus asset redistri-
bution. 
Moreover, since we are dealing with dualistic economies,we should 
consider at least three types of income, agricultural as well as non­
agricultural wage and non-agricultural property income. This adds a 
third effect, (GA - GNA)dcpA/ ( where NA stands for all non-agricultural 
dt 
1
income), which we may call the reallocation effect. This means that if 
agricultural income is more (less) equally distributed than non-agricultural 
income, any decline in the agricultural income share will clearly contribute 
to greater (lesser) overall inequality. Since, in the context of success­
ful dualistic development, we expect cpA to decline as labor is reallocated 
½he full equation becomes a bit more complicated, but nothing is 
fnndamentally altered. See Fei, Ranis and Kuo, op cit. Note the Factor 
Gini Effect also has the additional argument ~A (dGA/dt). 
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from agricultural to non-agri_cultural pursuits, the relative magnitudes of GA 
and GNA will determine the nature of the impact of the reallocation effect 
on the overall Gini. 
In this way changes in the overall Gini can be analyzed, both quali­
tatively and quantitatively, in terms of three "effects" which are tied 
to such growth related phenomena as labor's share (the fllllctional dis­
tribution effect), the relative importance of agriculture in the dualistic 
economy (the reallocation effect), as well as to changes in the inequality 
of various factor incomesthemselves (the factor Gini effect). All this 
provides us with a framework for reasoning about the causal linkages 
between growth, employment and equity in the typical Latin American as 
well as East Asian NIC's in different sub-phases of their transition 
growth effort. 
In what follows we shall try to establish some of the reasons for 
these observed differences by tracing the differential impact of the 
three kinds of effects we have identified--which are in turn related 
to differences in the underlying type of growth performance of the two 
types of NIC's over time. Since the data base for the two Latin American 
cases is not as good as that for Taiwan we will not be in a position to 
fully implement our decomposition formula but will have to contend 
ourselves with more suggestive or casual comparative empirical evidence. 
Let us first examine the comparative impact of the fllllctional 
distribution effect on the overall Gini. Clearly, as long as non­
agricultural wage income is more equally distributed than non-agricultural 
property income, i.e. G < G .--which does hold, as we would expect it w 11'' 
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to, in all cases and at all times-- the higher labor's share cf, , the lower w 
the level of the overall Gini,and the more it is rising the more likely is 
the Gini to decline--all ceteris paribus, of course. 
In the case of Colombia, labor's relative share in urban industry 
and services seems to lie between .35 and .41 without much movement.
1 
during the 1960's. Taiwan's urban non-agricultural wage share is sub­
stantially higher and rising gradually during the decade reaching .60 
I 
by the early 1970's. This would seem to give a substantial'advantage"to 
the East Asian case. Equally telling is the rise in the relative share of 
labor in the rural industries and services of the East Asian NIC's, 
i.e. from .21 in 1964 to .42 by 1972, while in the Colombian case, 
if of much less quantitative importance, we note a decline from .38 
to .24 between 1950 and 1975. 
We may thus conclude that the functional distribution effect 
favored a more equal distribution of income, absolutely and over 
time, in the East Asian case. Labor's relative share, in turn, can 
be traeed to a more labor intensive industrial growth path, both 
in terms of static technology choices, the nature of the output mix 
and the direction of technology change. The evidence (see Table 1 
Row 8) indicates that given labor surplus conditions during the 1960' s 
real wages did not rise very much in the East Asian case but somewhat 
more in Latin America. However, the East Asian NIC's' dramatic movement 
into labor-intensive industrial export substitution (compare the 1960 
and 1975 figures in rows 2 and 3) permitted a much more rapid rate of 
labor absorption and, via the functional distribution effect, the achieve­
ment of a much more equitable distribution of income (lower Gini) (see 
row 11). 
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We are not in a position to make a similar type of statement 
about the comparative contribution of the functional distribution 
effect in the earlier,primary import substitution sub-phase of growth. 
However, since nature does not "make jumps", the relatively "milder" 
set of import substitution policies generally pursued in East Asia 
probably made a contribution to the relatively greater reduction of 
income inequality in the SO's. At the end of the sixties, the East 
Asian NIC's, having expanded their labor-intensive industrial exports 
at a furious rate (see rows 2 and 3), had exhausted their unskilled 
labor surplus and beg~n to encounter rapidly rising real wage~ for 
the first time. This, as we would expect, represents a significant 
milestone along the transition growth path and is marked by the even 
stronger positive contribution of the functional distribution effect, 
i.e. it represents a milestone along the income distribution path as well. 
In the absence of the elimination of the unemployment/wderemployment 
conditions in the Latin American NIC's we observe no equivalent 
marked improvement in income distribution equity in Colombia or 
Mexico in the seventies (see row llJ. 
The fact that the advent of "full employment" has significance 
for growth as well as equity, of cours~,. represents encouraging 
support to our overall thesis. But much the more significant part 
of the story is that the societal choice of an export substitution 
growth phase can render rapid growth compatible with an improvement-­
or at least non-deterioration--of income distribution equity, long 
before real wages begin to rise in a sustained fashion. This is 
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because,cotmter to what both Arthur Lewis and Simon Kuznets casually 
assumed ,low wage rates are compatible with an increased wage share 
as poor families have more members employed, working more hours 
per week. 
The next quantitatively most powerful influence on the level 
and direction of change of the overal Gini resides in the reallocation 
effect, summarized in the third term presented above. It indicates 
that since any successfully growing developing economy is bound to 
be gradually shifting its center of gravity from agriculture to 
non-agriculture, dqiA is bound to be negative. Whether or not 
dt 
this effect helps or hurts income distribution equity depends on 
whether or not rural households' (merged) agricultural income is more 
equally distributed than their (merged) non-agricultural income, i.e. 
on the relationship between GA and GNA' As long as GA is larger than 
GNA' the anticipated gradual shift from agricultural income (the less 
equally distributed) to non-agricultural income (the more equally dis­
tributed) clearly helps, ceteris paribus,to reduce the overall Gini. 
Turning to the empirical side, in the case of the East Asian NIC' s, 
rural families' agricultural income was generally less equally distri­
buted than their non-agricultural income; moreover the share of non­
agricultural income in total income was both large and rapidly rising-­
together contributing to the overall improvement of the distribution 
of income. Specifically, in Taiwan the GA forruralhouseholds ranged 
from .35 in the mid-60's to .30 in the early 70's, with their total 
income Gini ranging from .31 to .28 (i.e. their non-agricultural Ginis 
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were indeed lower than their agricultural Ginis); moreover, the share 
of non-agricultural income in the total income of rural households 
rose from 32% in 1964 to a truly remarkable 53% in 1971. The Latin 
American family survey data available to us tmfortunately do not 
permit a differentiation between the agricultural and non-agricultural 
components of rural family incomes and it is therefore impossible to 
differentiate between the equality of the distribution of each of these 
flows. We may, with reasonable certainty, deduce, however, that if in 
Taiwan, given its small family holdings, its extensive land reform, 
its virtual absence of landless workers and its strong farmer association 
structure, rural industries and services income is more equally dis­
tributed than agricultural income, this is even more likely to be true 
in Colombia which has had no extensive land reform, has a much more 
unequal distribution of land, as well as a relatively large number of 
landless agricultural workers. 
With respect to the importance of the total non-agricultural 
income share in total rural family income, however, we have evidence 
for Colombia, for example, indicating that it is relatively low 
and probably declining, i.e. (see row 9) from 14% to 9% over two decades. 
This contrast is extremely important for two related reasons: one, 
it indicates the extent to which rural non-agricultural activity (i.e. 
rural industry and services) played a role in the industrial export 
substitution sub-phase of the East Asian NIC's; and, two, that the 
high and rising labor intensity of these activities (absolutely and 
relative to their Latin cotmterparts) permitted a dramatic absorption 
of the rural unemployed and underemployed. Independent evidence, moreover, 
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indicates that even in the 50's it was the smaller or landless farmers 
who participated proportionally more actively in these non-agricultural 
activities, thus contributing to the overall equalization of rural 
household incomes. But it was the remarkable, and growing, importance of 
a decentralized, labor-intensive industry and services sector--which 
incidentally (and surprisingly) grew even faster than its urban counter­
part in the Taiwan of the 60's--which was instrumental in making the 
reallocation effect a powerful instrument for eliminating the conflict 
between growth and equity in this East Asian NIC. 
Finally let us turn to the impact of the factor Gini effect, the 
final term in our decomposition equation. Empirically speaking, we 
may note that the main contribution to a lower overall Gini here, in 
the case of the East Asian >rural households, was provided via a 
reduction of the agricultural income Gini GA over time, from approxi­
mately .54 in 1953 to .35 in 1964 and .30 in 1972. 1 
In other words, while agricultural income is, as we have seen, 
less equally distributed across families than non-agricultural income, 
the degree of inequality has been falling. This, in the case of the 
East Asian NIC's, is due to the direct and indirecteffects of land 
reform, combined with the introduction, especially in Taiwan, of multi­
ple cropping,with secondary food crops, such as mushrooms and asparagus, 
more labor-intensive than traditional sugar and rice,increasing in 
importance. The land distribution Gini for Taiwan is .59 in contrast to 
.85 in Colombia (see row 13). Moreover, Colombia's agricultural output 
1while we do not have adequate data for the Latin American case, 
we would expect an increasing dG to be more powerful here, as a 
w 
dt 
negative influence due to the greater role of union-supported labor 
aristocracies in the Latin American case. 
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mix has shifted from traditional domestically oriented food crops, i.e. 
beans, plantain and cassava, for which labor makes up 40% of direct costs, 
to commercial export crops, i.e. cotton, soya and sugar, for which labor 
accounts for only 18%--just the oppo·site direction of what was encountered 
in the East Asian case. 
Our ability to isolate the various components of overall income 
distribution change and to link them to other, growth-related phenomena 
in these two types of NIC's has permitted us, in this fashion, to pin­
point the reasons for the existence of apparently larger conflicts or 
trade-offs in the Latin American case. It remains for us to briefly 
StnllIIlarize our findings and to inquire as to their relevance to the 
contemporary Latin American scene. 
IV. Swmnary and Conclusions 
In summary, then, the East Asian NIC's seem to have benefitted 
from initial conditions and policies which gave early attention to 
the rural economy, entailing both less neglect than "normal" for 
food producing agriculture via land reform and terms of trade main­
tenance as well as a strategy of decentralized industrialization 
during the primary import substitution sub-phase. Subsequently, we 
noted that the liberalization measures of the early 60's permitted a 
shift to an export substitution. strategy which yielded rapid export­
oriented growth combined with massive increases in employment and 
the ultimate termination of the labor surplus condition, ushering in 
secondary importand export substitution in the 70's. 
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In contrast, the Latin American NIC's may be said to have had less 
favorable initial conditions, to have pursued a more urban industry-oriented 
strategy during their primary import substitution phase, and to have 
moved directly from primary to secondary import substitution during the 
SO's and 60's. In more recent years this syndrome may be said to have been 
complemented by a strategy of export promotion which encourages in-
dustrial exports via selective subsidization or other direct actions 
without major change in the overall protective structure granted 
domestic industry. 
The really important question, of course, is to what extent Latin 
Americans should consider the divergent East Asian experience as 
at all relevant to their own contemporary problems. This, in turn 
breaks down into two related issues: to what extent has the Latin 
American performance been an inevitable consequence of her initial 
conditions and to what extent of perverse policies; and two, depending 
on the response to that,what,if anything, can be done today by those 
desirous to lift man-made constraints on better equity performance. 
We will,in conclusion, briefly attempt to address, if not answer, 
this question. 
Societies, like individuals, "do what comes naturally;"accordingly 
it should be no great surprise that Colombia, Mexico and Brazil whose 
development has been historically bia:ie::l towards such natural resource 
exports as gold, coffee and minerals, should have continued to rely 
heavily on primary exports in the course of their transition growth. 
This translates into both a relative neglect of food producing agriculture 
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and of the potential full utilization of unskilled human resources, as 
the society is able to keep financing a more and more costly type of 
import substitution industrialization at the end of her primary import sub­
stitution • Such a prolongation of import substitution or the "skipping" of 
a labor intensive primary export substitution phase is really made possible 
by the larger availability of natural resources--both by way of a 
relative "natural" overvaluation of exchange rates, and the assist of 
trade and domestically oriented intervention policies tending in the 
same direction. More natural resources and/or more foreign capital 
inflows clearly can be used to help ease the transition from one 
policy regime to another; just as easily they can be used to avoid 
unpleasant (at least for some interest groups) changes in the nature 
of the growth path. 
In the case of the East Asian NIC's the problem was in a sense 
easier; just as in Japan at an earlier date, the agricultural sector 
could be viewed as a temporary (and important) fuelling device, but 
the system's long run comparative advantage had to be found elsewhere, 
i.e. in the human resources area, first unskilled then skilled. The 
"natural" rate of exchange was not likely to be overvalued by "vent 
for surplus" commodities and predictably diminishing primary exports 
and, in the long term unreliable, foreign capital inflows had to be 
utilized so as to ease the transition towards more competitive export­
oriented growth regimes. 
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The extent to which the "skipping" of the primary export sub­
stitution phase in Latin America represents a politically convenient 
maneuver of the.elite,or a resources- dictated necessity constitutes a 
moot point. It is made more moot by the fact that actual NIC experienc~ 
whether Latin American or East Asi<111 is by no means as monolithic 
or clear-cut as described here. Societies move in ambiguous paths 
lurching in one direction one day, backing in another direction the 
next, yielding shades of gray, rather than the more extreme demar-
cations we have used here,for purposes of effect and illustration. 
Korea's performance, especially post-1968,for example, containsas 
many elements of export promotion as of export substitution--witness 
the setting of individual firm export quotas and .the relative neglect 
1of food producing agriculture Brazil's performance, on the other 
hand, especially between 1963 and 1973, contained as many elements 
of export substitution,yielding a burst in shoe and other labor 
intensive exports, as of export promotion. 
What may be viewed as some sort of rough convergence between Korea, 
the leastsuccessful (in our terms) of.the East Asian NIC's,and Brazil, 
the most successful Latin American NIC,should also give us some notion 
as to the policy options open to the contemporary Latin American case. 
In brief, there would appear to be nothing irreversible about any 
"ideal" sequence of transition phasing or irretrievable about opportunities 
foregone. In other words,greater attention to land reform and agri­
cultural productivity increase coupled with rural industrialization and 
¾or a fullerdiscussion of the divergence between Korea and 
Taiwan see "A Model of Growth and Employment in the Open 
Dualistic Economy: The Cases of Korea and Taiwan," G. Ranis and J. Fei 
Journal of Development Studies, Jan~ary 1975. (Reprinted in Employment 
Income Distribution and Development, Frances Stewart, ed., Frank Cass & Co., 
London, 1975. ) 
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shifts towards more labor intensive technolggies and output mixes 
generally can be achieved at any point in time. The most recently 
announced policy changes in Brazil,if vigorously pursued,represent 
an example; they should permit the mopping up of substantial pockets 
of underemployed labor, including in the North-East. 
This doesn't mean, of course, that the length of time typical 
secondary import substitution policies have been pursued is irrelevant 
to the ability to revers_!:! them. Vested interests encrusted in pro­
tectionist hot-houses since the 1930's are more likely to be resistant 
to the kind of policy changes we have been discussing. The discovery 
of additional natural resources and/or a boom in raw material prices 
make it all the more tempting to postpone any potentially unpleasant 
changes in structure. The same is true of easy access to foreign 
1capital. 
And there exist other arguments against policy reversal, e.g. to 
the effect that the East Asian NIC's were special cases, with especially 
favored access to DC capital and markets, and that the contemporary 
global trend towards protectionism will especially affect the LDC's 
export substitution/DC' s 'sunset" industries, rendering the East Asian 
NIC strategy obsolete. There is, moreover, little point in denying 
that the international trading world has become less open in recent 
years and that this trend is ominous for all sorts of reasons, including 
1
As Fishlow put it most recently ("Brazilian Development in Long-term 
Perspective", American Economic Review, May 1980) "favorable and new 
access to capital markets that contributed to earlier growth has sub­
sequently facilitated inappropriate economic policies that now bind 
further options." 
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its effect on the transition growth efforts of contemporary Latin .Ameri­
can NIC's. Yet one can also read the historical record, e.g. Taiwan's, 
as one of overcoming substantial disadvantages, including a much 
worse natural resources base, successive major political upheavals, 
followed by the continuous drain of high defense expenditures and 
partial international isolation; and, far from favored trade treatment 
by the DC's, one of being the subject of increasingly severe quota 
restrictions. 
The fact that the East Asian NIC's were apparently able in recent 
years to weather the multiple punches of increased protectionism, oil 
crisis and global stagflation is testimony to the flexibility which the 
alternative growth sequence entails. It should, moreover, not be lost 
on the Latin .American NIC's that, now that the original "Gang of Four" 
has graduated from primary export substitution into the "promised land" 
of secondary import cum export substitution, other countries in the 
region, most prominently Malaysia and possibly Indonesia--eventually even 
the Philippines--m~y be turning to fill the primary export substitution 
niche in world trade. This niche is, of course, not of limited size 
but expandable in terms of trade among LDC's as well in filling SITC 
"holes" in the trade with the advanced countries. 
In the final analysis, the basic issue is whether various Latin 
.American NIC interest groups can be persuaded that a change in direction 
may be in their own longer term interest. The ability to persuade 
industrialists, for example, that a switch to export substitution in­
dustries will provide larger profits on expanded volume than export 
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promotion efforts on smaller volumes helped by negotiated subsidies 
depends on the extent of workably competitive pressures the system is 
really willing to expose them to--as it does on the extent to which 
the civil service is willing to share some of its direct negotiation 
and control power, and organized sector labor to substitute working 
family income over wages as an objective. The acceptance or rejection 
of technical arguments on how the constraints to better employment 
and equity performance with more (rather than less) growth can be 
weakened must clearly be the first order of business; but there will 
still remain the domestic political economy or "reform-mongering" 
issues of how to get there. 
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Table 1 
Taiwan Colombia Mexico 
1953 1960 1975 1950 1960 1975 1950 1960 1975 
I. Growth Phase Indicators 
('70) 
1) M/M Primary IS index 17.2 8.1 6.8 14.0 6.0 8.0 13.61 10.96 8.81 
(consumer goods imports 
as% total imports) 
2) ~A/X .8.6 32. 3 83.6 16.7 21.2 20.8 46.4 35.9 51.2 
non-agricul t:ural exports 
as% total exports 
( I 51) ('65) 
3) X/GDP 9.8 11. 7 41.8 15.0 15.6 14.9 17 .o 9.5 7.6 
total exports as % GDP 
(53-60)(60-68) (68-75) (50-60)(60-75) (50-60) (60-
4) 2.7 6,85 5 .34 1.7 2.5 2.8 3 8nPCY 
average annual grO\olth rate 
in real per capita income 
(' 51) 
5) I/GNP 12.6 20.l 28.8 11.3 18.3 19.2 11.7 16.4 22.2 
investment rate 
(' 51) 
6) S/GNP 15. 7 17.7 25,7 7.2 9.5 7,4 10.0 11.6 
savings rate 
II. EmElorment and Distribu-
tion Indicators 
( I 51) 
7) e 37.2 43. 9 55.6 28.0 48.5 62.l 32. 0 44.9 54.8 
% labor in non-agricul-
tural activities 
8) WNA (base year= 100) 100.0 75. 3 120. 7 100.0 132.8 180.2 100.0 105.6 148.7 
real non-agricultural 
wage 
9) r r YNA/YT 





14.3 12. 7 9.04 
non-agricultural income 
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2.5 6.1 3. 7 
('70; 
4.2 
share of income going 
to bottom 20% 





land distribution Gini 
14) illiteracy rate 49.0 27.1 20,5 37.7 27.1 
(' 70) 









wage share in rural 
non-agriculture 
('74) 
16) i,w 51.1 53.2 58,7 34.8 39.2 40.5 
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